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INTRODUCTION
Before 1989, Germans used the term "Wende
(the turn) to
refer to the transition from the Schmidt to the Kohl government in
1981-82. This meaning disappeared overnight between November 9
"

and JO,

1989. The real Wende became the revolution in the GDR and

the subsequent unification of the two Germanys. Doubtless this shift
in meaning was justified. By October

1990, Germany had experi

enced far more than a change in political leadership. It now had new
expanded borders,

17 million new citizens, and a mountain of

challenges to overcome.
Among the myriad problems confronting Germany, migration
was paramount. Indeed, it seems fair, in retrospect, to claim that
migration (or the threat of it) inspired the revolution and determined
the collapse of the GDR. Nor is it outlandish to suggest that migra
tion set the pace and terms of unification. Once the Krenz regime
opened the Berlin Wall and let its people vote with their feet, it had
no real chance of surviving. Similarly, had Helmut Kohl not quickly
promised reunification, he would have likely faced massive emigra
tion from East Germans.
A new nation-state was formed under the pressure of

17 million newcomers produced by
3, 1 990, the FRG already had over 5 million

migration. In addition to the
unification on October

foreign workers and refugees. Moreover, unusually large numbers
of refugees from East Europe and elsewhere (nearly 500,000 in

1992, alone') sought to take advantage of Germany's liberal laws
regulating political asylum. These numbers imply that well over one
quarter of united Germany's residents are migrants or newcomers of
one sort or the other. There can be no denying that Germany has
become a land of immigration.
Anxiety has surfaced that Germany is reviving and reverting
to an aggressive and atavistic racism in response to Iarge·scale
emigration. Hundreds of books, articles and conferences in recent
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years have addressed this theme.2 Both the number and intensity of
criminal acts hostile to foreigners increased after unification (2426
in 1991 to 6336 in 1992).3 According to the Agency for the Protec
tion of the Constitution. the number of right-wing extremist groups
rose from 76 in 1991 to 82 in 1992. encompassing an estimated
41,900 members.4 One recent survey found that three quarters of
polled Germans view the "foreigner problem" as the most important
issue in Germany .5 In response to growing xenophobia, the
Bundestag recently amended the constitution to toughen its article
(16) regarding political asylum. Germany again seems a place
neither comfortable nor safe for non-Germans.
This essay contends that these fears are exaggerated. I do not
deny signs of resurgent racism or rising xenophobia. However, I
insist that they do not signal a return to a Nazi or Nazi-like
Germany. Rather, I argue that such sentiments have found little
realization in legislation hostile to foreigners, particularly those
living in the FRG. On the contrary, I show that much legislation has
been passed or proposed which is beneficial to foreigners and even
more which is hostile to (some) Germans both inside and outside the
FRG. Put differently, if Germany needs a systematic policy of
exclusion to deal with its migrant problem, there is not much
evidence which points to a deliberate racist strategy.
Does this mean there is no politics of exclusion evolving in
Germany? No! I aim to show that the emerging politics of exclusion
rests more on the principles of liberalism than on racism. In a recent
essay Etienne Balibar discerns an emerging shift in the instruments
and justifications of discrimination:
It may well be that the current variants of neo
racism are merely a transitional ideological
formation, which is destined to develop towards
discourses and social technologies in which the
aspect of the historical recounting of genealogical
myths (the play of substitutions between race,
people, culture and nation) will give way... to the
aspect of psychological assessment of intellectual
aptitudes and dispositions which a battery of
cognitive, socio-psychological and statistical
sciences would then undertake to measure, select
and monitor, striking a balance between heredi-
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tary and environmental factors.... In other words,
that ideological formation would develop towards
a "post-racism."6
Building off Balibar, I suggest that a "post-racial" discrimina
tion founded on liberalism is discernible in the new Germany.
EUPHORIC NATIONALISM AND RESURGENT RACISM
"What belongs together grows together." These volkisch
sounding words uttered shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall by
Willy Brandt - a man who fought much of his life against racism reveal the nearly irresistible appeal of German nationalism in
November of 1989. One nation forcibly divided for four decades
could again forge together. And most Germans felt, like Brandt, that
it was only natural that Germans unite. The West Germans were as
willing to welcome their eastern brethren as the East Germans were
eager to visit the West. As the latter first crossed over they were met
with much pageantry and 100 crisp D marks. The generosity
persisted and intensified. The roughly 2.5 million Germans east of
the FRG who decided to move to the West received extensive and
expensive public assistance to help them resettle (over 10 billion DM
in 1992).7 Moreover, they gained immediate and automatic citizen
ship as stipulated in Article 116 of the Basic Law. The Germans who
stayed in the GDR were offered an extraordinarily favorable
exchange rate for their East German marks in July of 1990. Later on
October 3, the day of unification, they became de facto citizens of
the FRG rather than the mere de jure citizens they had been since
1949. In addition, the Kohl administration announced after the
general elections of 1991 that it would allocate some 100 billion DM
(roughly one quarter of the federal budget) for reconstruction and
improvements in the eastern provinces.
Foreigners watched these developments with deep frustration.
Integration had commenced in the Seventies but had progressed
slowly. Foreigners (55% of whom have lived in the FRG for more
than IO years, over one million of whom were born in the FRG, and
all of whom combined pay roughly 90 billion DM annually in taxes)
had been told time and again by Bonn that it would take a long time
before they would "catch up" socio-economically with the West
Germans.8 But the Chancellor promised East Germans, before any
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of them paid a single tax, that he would bring West German socio
economic standards to them in 5 short years. Although foreigners
received some purely consultative political representation in various
"Foreigners Councils," the German government had steadfastly
refused for two decades to grant them even municipal voting rights.9
Restrictive requirements for naturalization left the FRG with the
lowest rate of naturalization in the industrial world. IO Yet, according
to Article 116 of the Basic Law, the estimated 8 million Germans
living in the former Soviet bloc enjoyed a right to immediate
German citizenship.
Put differently, the legislation aimed at Germans from the east
was blatantly discriminatory and racist. Article 116 grants citizen
ship on the basis of ethnicity rather than territory. The right of
citizenship belongs to "everyone... who, as a refugee or expellee of
German ethnicity, or as a spouse or descendent of such persons, has
been admitted to the territory of the German Reich as it existed on
December 31, 1937." l l In 1937, German ethnicity was defined by
the racist Nuremberg Laws of 1935. This law and the practices it
sanctioned also helped to fuel the increasing hostility toward foreign
ers after unification. As Germans began to realize that the costs of
unification would far exceed the optimistic projections of Chancellor
Kohl in 1990, many began entertaining ideas of targeting foreigners
as the ones who should bear the greatest hardships. Germans for
whom unification turned sour (particularly youths in the east) looked
to foreigners as scapegoats and began verbally to demand and even
physically to ensure their elimination from the land. Although
neither the. government nor the constitution ever sanctioned the
maltreatment of foreigners, both sanctioned preferential treatment of
Germans. Had the government further pursued or strengthened this
policy, a systematic policy of discrimination based on race would
have developed. But it did not.
REVIVED LIBERALISM
Opposition and limitations to racism soon sprang up from
various quarters. Esteemed President Richard von Weizsacker led
the way by frequently condemning xenophobic acts and attitudes. In
the summer of 199 I, Liselotte Funcke, Kohl's Commissioner for
Alien Affairs, resigned in bitter and public protest over the unfair
treatment of foreigners. Kohl himself called the riots in Restock "a
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national disgrace." Hundreds of other prominent personalities
publicly condemned xenophobia and praised the idea of a "multi
cultural society."12 Average German citizens organized demonstra
tions for foreigners far larger in numbers than those against them
(such as the mass candlelight marches against racist violence).
Practical considerations also discredited a purely racist
approach. Demographic and economic studies commissioned by the
government have consistently concluded that Germany's economy
will continue to depend on the long-term presence of foreign labor
into the foreseeable future. t l Furthermore, poorly trained East
German workers could hardly be expected productively to replace
foreigners who had been on the job for years. Countless studies
reported rates of productivity among East German workers far
below rates in counterpart industries in the west (on average,
50% ).14 Nor could resident aliens simply be sent home. At the time
of unification, for example, 70% of them possessed the irrevocable
residence entitlement. IS Diplomatically, the government's hands
were tied as well. Article 48 of the Treaty of Rome guarantees all
members of the European Union the right to work and reside in
Germany. Moreover, the Maastricht Treaty provided for local
voting rights for these 1.5 million EU members residing in the FRG.
Meanwhile, the European Council took steps in 1993 to make dual
citizenship easier (and therefore migrant naturalization more likely)
in member states. t 6 EU members are not the only ones well
protected. A Treaty signed with Turkey in 1972 prohibits Germany
from forcibly deporting any of the nearly 2 million Turks in the
land (so long as they do not violate laws). A treaty signed with
Poland in 1991 allows Poles to travel in Germany without a visa.
Most importantly, the Basic Law has many protections for foreign
ers. The basic civil liberties of the first 19 Articles are guaranteed to
all persons, not just to Germans, and the courts have consistently
struck down policies which violate foreigners' rights.17 If Germany
needed a strategy to deal with its migration crisis, in other words, an
overtly racist one proved neither feasible nor desirable.
In fact, the only legislation passed since 1990 which is
blatantly hostile to foreigners is the revision of the asylum laws in
July of 1993. However, this is designed adversely to affect primarily
refugees residing outside the FRG after July. All applicants for
political asylum who enter Germany from countries complying with
the Geneva Convention for Refugees and the European Rights
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Convention will automatically be sent back to the departed country.
In addition, the German government has stipulated the same policy
for all countries which it deems politically "safe;" and all nine of the
FRG' s contiguous neighbors have earned the distinction. Practically,
thi,s means that all refugees who enter Germany via land routes are
turned away. Moreover, all applicants in foreign countries must now
apply at the German Embassy in their country and await a decision
there. The policy is clearly designed to stop refugees before they
enter the FRG, since 95% of them are on average denied asylum.
The new law appears to be working. During the first year after it
went into effect, the number of new applicants dropped from
438,191 in 1992 to 322,600 in 1993 to 127,210 in 1994.18
The new law, however, is not nearly as tough on the roughly
one million applicants already in the FRG. Their basic welfare must,
under Article 16 of the constitution, be guaranteed until their appli
cation is complete. And even once rejected - a process which often
takes years to complete - appeals and stays are not impossible. For
instance, during the winter of 1994-95, the Ministry of Interior
placed a three-month moratorium on the expulsion of rejected
Kurdish refugees and established a bilateral commission with Ankara
to monitor the treatment of Kurdish returnees.19 Of course, the new
law affects in no way the nearly 6 million resident aliens in the FRG.
Recently, regulations regarding ethnic Germans living outside
the FRG have tightened. For instance, after July, 1991, ethnic
Germans have been required to apply for visas to Germany in their
homelands rather than simply show up at the border claiming the
rights of Article 1I6. The Supreme Administrative Court has ruled
that ethnic Germans living in lands which guarantee the rights of
German minorities (for instance, Poland) should no longer expect to
receive automatic asylum or citizenship based on Article 116. And in
1992, the Kohl administration established an annual limit of 220,000
ethnic Germans permitted to naturalize. Social services available to .
the German newcomers were also reduced to six months of language
training and no more than 15 months of social welfare payments.
These new measures have discouraged German immigration; the rate
in 1994 was 56% of the figure for 1992 and 90% for 1993.20
As for new legislation aimed at non-German immigrants, it is
mostly beneficial to them. On January 1, 1991, a new Aliens Law
went into effect. The law substantially liberalizes the requirements
for citizenship. Under its provisions, aliens under the age of 23 (over
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2 million) have a right to naturalize so long as they have resided in
Germany at least 8 years, attended school there for 6, and not been
convicted of a felony (Paragraph 85). Those 23 and older have to
have lived in Germany at least 15 years, not have been convicted of a
felony, and not be collecting social assistance (Paragraph 86).
Moreover, in the wake of the fatal arson attack on a refugee dormi
tory in Solingen in 1993, the Kohl government responded with a
proposal to grant automatic German citizenship to children under 18
whose parents have lived in Germany for at least 10 years and one of
whose parents was born in the FRG. The youngsters (roughly one
million) are allowed to possess dual citizenship until they turn 18, at
which time they must.relinquish one or the other.
Efforts to curb xenophobia have increased. Since 1989, state
and federal governments have banned 1 0 neo-Nazi organizations,2 1

and in 1995, a state court in Karlsruhe sentenced Gunter Deckert, the
leader of the far right-wing National Democratic Party of Germany,
to two years imprisonment for inciting fear. A year earlier, the
Federal Constitutional Court ruled that denial of the Holocaust is not
protected under freedom of expression. A year before that,
parliament amended the Victims Indemnity Law to make foreign
victims equal to Germans for benefits. In 1994, Kohl's government
successfully proposed that the Bundestag expand the powers of the
police and intelligence service to apprehend even more right-wing
extremists as well as ban neo-Nazi symbols from public. The
measures have proven effective. From 1993 to 1994, the number of
reported hostile acts against foreigners halved.22
We should be careful not to conclude from these developments
that foreigners enjoy an equal status with West Germans. Statisti
cally, their standard of living continues to lag behind that of West
Germans.23 Resident aliens cannot enjoy full rights of political
participation unless they naturalize. Nevertheless, it is undeniable
that most of the legislation passed since unification concerning
foreigners in Germany has been based on liberal principles which
condemn discrimination on the basis of race, nation, or creed.
INTEGRATION
No group, save the convicted neo-Nazis, experienced the
minimal racial solidarity in Germany after unification more than the
East German newcomers. What was originally celebrated as the
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coming together of a divided people soon became experienced as a
takeover by foreign invaders. And words like "invasion" and
"colonization" are now commonly heard in reference to unification.
Like foreigners, East Germans live below the West German standard
of living (for example, 70% of the average West German household
income24 and 27% of the average household's total assets25) and now
hear from officials that this is likely to persist for at least a genera
tion. Like foreigners, East Germans suffer higher rates of
unemployment than West Germans (13.5% and 8.2% respectively at
the close of 199426). And as foreigners did throughout the Seventies
and Eighties, East Germans have begun to organize among therp
selves to protest their situation. Nearly 20% of them voted for the
successor party to East Germany's Communist Party (PDS) in the
federal elections October, 1994.
These similarities are not superficial. They stem from the fact
that East Germans and foreigners are both the objects of deliberate
campaigns of integration, and as such politically subordinate to West
Germans. The politically subordinate position of foreigners is
obvious and easy to explain: as aliens they do not enjoy full rights of
political participation. The subordination of East Germans is more
complicated because they are citizens. However, unification involved
the systematic political subordination of East Germans. In the first
place, West German political parties and personalities dominated the
first free election in the GDR (spending a total of 40 million DM).
The CDU and SPD captured over 60% of the vote compared to 2.9%
for New Forum and Democracy Now. Referring to the influence of
the West German parties, former East Berlin mayor pfarrer Albertz
remarked: "An invasion would have been more honest."27
Dominating both regimes, Christian Democrats were able to
structure unification as they wanted. The choice to annex the eastern
provinces, as allowed in Article 23 of the Basic Law, meant not only
that no new constitution would be drafted, but also that the condi
tions of unification would not have to be ratified in a national
plebiscite. Moreover, the East Germans were integrated into a
federal structure in which they represented a minority vis-a-vis West
Germans in both the Bundestag and Bundesrat. A survey taken in
Berlin in December of 1990 found that 42.4% of polled East
Germans felt shut out of the unification negotiations, while another
36.7% felt they were merely onlookers.28
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The Treaty of Unification gave sweeping power to Bonn. Most
notably, Article 25 placed under the auspices of the Finance Ministry
the Trust Agency, which controlled all East German industry. The
entire civil service was to be changed so as to emulate the West
German public sector (Article 20). Furthermore, the Treaty stipu
lated that East German public servants could be dismissed if they
were deemed incompetent, were no longer needed, had violated
internationally recognized principles of humanity, or had worked for
the GDR's Ministry of State Security or Office of National
Security.29 The Treaty opened the way for a total restructuring of
East Germany.
Although this process of integrating East Germany and East
Germans into the Federal Republic has been far more dramatic and
drastic than the process of integrating foreigners, the two processes
share significant similarities. After the recession of 1966-67, the
West German government decided to terminate its practice of
"rotating" guest-workers back to their homelands after two years.
Businesses had complained that their investment in foreign laborers
only really paid off after a year or two of training. The Ministry of
Labor then initiated the practice of liberally awarding long-term and
unlimited work permits to foreigners. Thus began the gradual
process of integrating foreigners into the labor market as permanent
workers. And although this integration has proceeded slowly at
times, it has proceeded steadily.30
East Germans too had to be integrated into the West German
labor market after October 3, 1 990. Although the campaign often
has entailed the full-scale absorption of East German organizations
and enterprises into their West German counterpans (for instance, in
the case of the meclia3I or organized labor32), its most consequential
feature has been the systematic de-industrialization of the eastern
provinces. Between 1989 and 1 991, the GDP in what some have
termed Germany's Mezzogiorno 33 declined 40%, industrial produc
tion 70%, employment 40%. While East Germans comprise over
20% of Germany's population, East German GDP by 1994
constituted only 7.9% of the total GDP, 2% of ei<ports.34 As the
Trust Agency privatized its roughly 13,000 firms, the new owners
typically "down-sized" the personneJ.35 By 1993, more than half of
the jobs which existed in 1 989 in East Germany had disappeared.36
By 1 992, only 31% of East Germans had continued working uninter
ruptedly in the same position they held before unification. In 1989,
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9.5 million people were employed in East Germany; in 1994 6
million. 13.5% of eligible workers are officially unemployed; yet
another 20% work in the various "job-creation" positions slotted for
eventual termination. Over l million East Germans have fled west
and about 500,000 commute to the west.37
Integrating the public sector into the FRG has likewise entailed
massive changes. The overwhelming majority of East German laws
and procedures were invalidated overnight. Courts and police offices
had to enforce new laws. Welfare agencies had to provide different
services. Schools and universities had to adopt new curricula.
Generally, this has taken place by retraining, replacing or terminat
ing personnel. And for the most part, it has been West Germans who
have made these critical decisions. By late 1992, roughly 1400
western federal and 8400 western state administrators were working
in leadership positions in the east.38 By 1993 in Brandenburg, for
example, 52% of high-level civil servants were West Germans, 73%
in the Chancellery, 72% in the Ministry of Justice, 67% in the
Ministry of Finance. Each of the eastern provinces have West
German "partner provinces" which regularly send public servants to
the east to provide aid and assistance. During 1993, for instance,
North Rhine-Westphalia sent 22% (956) of its top civil servants to
help in Brandenburg.39 On the inverse side, 200,000 East Germans
left their public-service jobs by October, 1992.40
The education system has witnessed similar changes. The
Science Council and the Commissions on High School Structure in
each province, all of which became dominated by West Germans,
were charged with remaking the system of higher education and
scientific research in East Germany after the image of West
Germany. With the powers granted them by Article 38 of the Treaty
of Unification, the two bodies launched extensive reforms in
curricula and personnel. Entire disciplines in the humanities and
social sciences deemed to be "close to the regime" of the GDR were
either eliminated or fully restructured. In these disciplines, one study
concluded, "today there are hardly any professors from the east
left." The other disciplines experienced major personnel, if not
curricular changes. The same study estimates that in these disciplines
roughly one-third of the academic positions are held by West
Germans.41 The number of positions available in the many non
teaching research institutes of East Germany dropped from 31,000 in
1991 to 13,500 in 1994.42 Similar drastic changes took place in the
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secondary and primary schools as well as the public cultural and
athletic institutions.43
West Germans wound up possessing and wielding far more
power in East Germany than most East Germans originally expected.
In September of 1990, roughly 7% of polled East Germans opposed
the importation of West German elites; by November of 1992, the
figure had risen to 34%. Indeed, West Germans residing in the east
tied with Turks in the survey for the least liked newcomers in the
eastern provinces.44 As early as 1991, 49% of questioned East
Germans felt that most of their erstwhile compatriots viewed unifi
cation as a mistake.45 By 1995, 16% of polled East Germans (in
contrast to 47% of polled West Germans) said they were satisfied
with Germany's corpus of laws;46 53% claimed unification had
turned out "worse than I expected;" and 72% considered themselves
"second-class citizens."47
Although far less drastic than the campaign aimed at East
Germans, West German elites initiated a campaign in the early
Seventies to get control of foreigners' institutions. After the dramatic
wildcat strike in the Ford Factory in Cologne in 1973, during which
Turkish workers broke off contact with JG Metal, the DGB made a
conscious effort to integrate foreign workers into the German
unions. By 1982, Turkish workers were more unionized than
Germans (48% to 40%; 33.6% for all migrant laborers).48
Once the Labor Ministry stopped the practice of rotating
guest-workers back to their homelands, the number of foreigners in
Germany increased dramatically (from 1.3 million in 1966 to 4.5
million in 1980). Now permanently employed, foreign workers
naturally wished to bring their families to West Germany. By 1971,
35% of foreigners (more than 1 million) were dependents. In I972,
the Ministry of Labor launched an official campaign for the
"Integration of Foreign Workers and their Families." The policy
largely involved extending the wide net of the welfare state to take in
foreigners.49 By roughly 1980, foreigners enjoyed the same social
welfare benefits as West Germans.SO
In the late Seventies, much public concern surfaced over the
existence of some 1000 mosques and Koran schools in Germany.
Officials feared that Muslim pupils were being taught norms and
values there which were anathema to the liberal democratic princi
ples taught in the public schools. In 1980, North Rhine-Westphalia
became the first province to offer Islamic alongside Catholic and
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Evangelical instruction in the public schools. Most provinces with
large foreign populations soon followed suit. Indeed, all schools in
Germany with large numbers of foreign pupils now utilize a special
"foreigner pedagogy" to integrate the migrants into the general
curriculum. Local and provincial governments have also since the
late Seventies offered governmental subsidies to Islamic (and other
migrant) organizations which agree to operate in accordance with the
liberal principles enunciated in the Basic Law.51
LIBERAL AND ILLIBERAL CITIZENS
Both foreigners and East Germans receive considerable social,
economic and cultural support from the Federal Republic as target
groups of integration, but at the price of political equality, whether
de facto or de jure, with West Germans. West German leaders can
tolerate (and rationalize) this inequality because they cast East
Germans and foreigners as different, deviant, deficient. Both
campaigns of integration, in other words, create and rely on the
proverbial negative "Other." "Integration," "assimilation,"
"incorporation" - all common terms applied to both campaigns make no sense unless there is a foreigner - someone different from
West Germans - who needs to be integrated. And what makes them
different is an alleged absence of an internalized commitment to the
liberal principles on which the republic is founded.
Since unification, West German social scientists (often with the
financial support of government) have carried out numerous studies
of the political culture of East Germans. During the Seventies and
Eighties, West German social scientists (often with the financial
support of government) carried out numerous studies of the political
culture of foreigners. These studies share unmistakable similarities
and produce virtually identical images of their subjects. First,
foreigners and East Germans are persons who have been socialized
in authoritarian political cultures outside the FRG. Second, they are
persons experiencing rapid social change. Third, they suffer from a
number of social and psychological pathologies, one of which is a
tendency toward anti-democratic political extremism. And fourth,
they represent a threat to the "basic free democratic order" of the
FRG and must be re-socialized to respect the liberal democratic
values of West German political culture before they can be fully
trusted.
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Kurt Sontheimer's analysis of East German political culture
typifies the view common among West German social scientists. He
insists that the old pre-war authoritarian political culture survived in
the GDR despite the transformation to communism: "This official
political culture sanctioned by the Party and State thus built off
German traditions... of the leading Party and of the State with a
decided priority over the needs and tendencies of the individual."
Furthermore, their political culture was "tainted more strongly than
that of the Federal Republic with traditional attitudes which came out
of German history. Thus the GDR society appeared in the judgment
of some observers 'more German' than the quickly modernizing and
Americanizing Federal Republic."52
West German studies invariably note the major differences
between the predominant norms and values in the FRG and in the
GDR and emphasize the great difficulties East Germans face in
adapting to their new society. "There exists a significant discrep
ancy," concluded a study commissioned by the Federal Agency for
AU-German Efforts, "between the behavioral repertoire of the
erstwhile GDR citizens and the new challenges. The mental demands
which pluralistic democracy and social market economy place on
social actors are totally different. "53 Another study implored readers
to keep in mind "that 16 million GDR citizens have with the regime
and system transformation lost their identity overnight. "54 Both
studies conclude that East Germans suffer from various social and
psychological problems such as a "collapse of a holy, ordered
world," "anomie," "culture shock," "identity vacuum" which stem
from feeling like "a foreigner in one's own land." They exhibit such
symptoms as "depression," "GDR nostalgia," "self-doubt," "suicide,"
"excessive consumption" and "criminality."
But the most disturbing deviance is a tendency to support
political extremism, far right or left. Thus countless studies interpret
the rise in neo-Nazi activities and organizations in East Germany as a
reaction against rapid social change combined with deficient
appreciation of liberal democratic norms and values. For example,
Hans-Gerd Jaschke writes: "the reasons for the increase in the
number of right-wing extremists seem to be...the feeling of social
discrimination, the lack of other traditionally established political
orientations, the lack of experience in dealing with strangers and
practical everyday problems.SS "The sum total of all the frustra
tions," concludes another study, "becomes vented in slogans like
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'Germany for the Germans - Foreigners out!' Violent hooligans and
applauding observers do not want to accept that indigent refugees,
victims of political persecution or religious minorities are being
integrated into the commonwealth. Instead, the alleged uniform,
homogeneous society is preferred. "56 Others see persistent suppon
for the PDS as evidence that the "authoritarian-repressive structures
of the society have not yet really been overcome."57 The same holds
true for "GDR nostalgia." "This can be interpreted as a 'new myth of
the social welfare in the former GDR' and hints at a political
instability in the eastern pan of Germany, comparable to the one in
the FRG in the 1960s."58 The conclusion to be drawn from these
various studies is that East Germans have yet to become genuine
liberal democrats:
Citizens of the former GDR have already
developed affective ties to their new political
community. However, these are not overflow con
sequences from satisfaction with politics and
democracy or primarily politically motivated. On
the contrary, they are either rooted in historical
experience and social relations or closely linked to
the economic benefits that are expected from
belonging to this political community. With
regard to this latter aspect these ties will be
affected by any disappointment of economic
hopes.59
This image of East Germans mirrors the one of foreigners
produced by social scientists during the Seventies and Eighties. The
many scholars who moved into so-called "foreigner research" in
those decades diagnosed foreigners with vinually the same socio
psychological illnesses and pathologies discussed above. Moreover,
the root cause was understood to be the rapid transformation from
traditional agricultural societies to the modern industrial society of
the FRG. Thus Ursula Neumann in a prominent study of migrant
families argued that their tendency to cling to tradition in Germany:
is not to be understood as a natural continuation
of the lifestyle in the homeland, rather as a
defense against the changed environment. The
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confrontation with the divergent ways of the
surrounding world creates in every case a sense of
uncertainty, a strain on the personality. [This
leads] to signs of retreat and compensation, such
as exaggeration of traditional norms and values,
idealization of the homeland, avoidance of contact
with the German environment.60
And as later with East Germans, political extremism among foreign
ers, particularly Turks, became a major concern of West Germans.6 1

Several Turkish migrant organizations were placed under surveil
lance by the Agency for the Protection of the Constitution during the
Eighties just as several East German organizations have been since
unification. Both major political parties took hard stances against
political extremism as well as suffrage for migrants. The SPD

demanded that "the activities of anti-democratic and criminal
migrant organizations...be monitored with all available legal and
organizational means" and concluded that "the introduction of
municipal voting rights [for foreigners] does not seem sensible at this
time. "62 The CDU declared:
If the franchise were granted, the participation of
foreign national parties in elections could not be
avoided. Whoever in recent months has pursued
the excesses of foreign extremism in the Federal

Republic - the buzzwords Kurdish terrorism and

the appearance of fanatical Turkish nationalists

suffice - knows that the last thing we need is
campaign battles between left-wing and right
wing extremist foreign parties in the Federal

Republic. 63

Although such repressive and restncuve measures

are

appropriate in the short-run, they will not do in the long-run. Only
thorough re-socialization of newcomers can fully secure the demo
cratic order. In 1978, the Federal Commissioner for Aliens
announced that education would represent the "focal point" of the
Schmidt administration's immigration policy. The reason, he ex
plained, was that the internalization of liberal democratic norms and
values was essential if foreigners were to reside in Germany
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permanently; and only the schools could be expected to teach these
norms and values.64 The CDU insisted that full integration ultimately
had to mean an internalized respect for "the human dignity and value
structure of our constitution" and urged making the distinction
between superficial "outer assimilation" and genuine "inner assimila
tion." The latter could only come after a long process of socialization
in the public schools.65 It is not surprising, then, that both parties
support more liberal naturalization requirements for young foreign
ers schooled in Germany than for older ones schooled in the
homeland.
The re-socialization of East Germans can also be expected to
take a long time, West Germans insist. Hans-Joachim Maaz writes in
his study of East German political culture: "Democracy cannot...be
put on like a coat, rather it must take root in the minds and hearts....
Democracy can only prevail ... if it begins in the souls of men ."66

Katharina Belwe argues that "it will take a longer individual and
collective learning process before the East German citizens can be
made equal to the citizens of the old federal states in competition for
jobs but also political and social positions." 67
Such rationalizations of postponed equality for East Germans
sound unmistakably similar to those resident aliens have heard for
years. Delaying full sovereignty to newcomers seems natural to West
Germans. After World War II, they were welcomed into the western
alliance of liberal democratic nation-states, but not as fully sovereign
members. As the Allies built the Federal Republic and integrated it
into the western alliance, they only gradually relinquished
sovereignty to West Germany. They first had to be satisfied not only
that liberal democratic structures and institutions were in place, but
that a liberal democratic political culture was widely internalized by
the citizenry. West Germans are simply doing to East Germans and
foreigners what was once done to themselves. And since the latter is
generally understood as a grand success story, there seems no good
reason not to repeat (actually extend) the process of converting more
newcomers to the nation state to its core liberal democratic values.
This mode of thinking receives clear expression in the following
passage of a major study on East German political culture
commissioned by the Federal Ministries for Technology and
Research and for Labor and Social Order:
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The development of a stable democracy needs
time. So it was after the Second World War in
West Germany. Democratization is a long-term
process. This is true in particular for the
development of a democratic political culture....
The population of the former GDR initially
oriented itself mainly around the living standards
of the old Federal Republic ...and not very much
around the democratic values. The development
of a democratic value system will demand consid
erable time. These developments thoroughly
correspond to the experiences in the old Federal
Republic following the war.68
CONCLUSION
I have stressed the similarities in the treatment and perception
of foreigners and East Germans with two points in mind. First, since
East and West Germans do have race and nation in common and East
Germans and foreigners do not, racism or volkisch nationalism
cannot be the ideological source of the inequality both experience
vis-a-vis West Germans. Second, if, as I have argued, it is the alleged
illiberalism of East Germans and foreigners which distinguishes
them from West Germans, then liberalism (more accurately, the
conviction on the part of West German leaders that they are genuine
liberals and the others are not) ideologically motivates and rational
izes the inequality between the groups. And this suggests that
Balibar's "post-racism," in this case based on a distinction between
liberal and illiberal traits, is operating in united Germany as an
"ideological formation" rationalizing inequality.
A focus on post-racism can significantly change the way we
view united Germany and its relations with the many non-Germans
in and around it who wish to reside there. From the popular premise
of enduring German racism, we should expect united Germany to
show preference toward Germans both inside and outside the FRG
and disdain toward non-Germans both inside and outside of the FRG.
But as I have argued, this simplistic reading fails to account for the
real statuses of privileged and under-privileged enjoyed or suffered
in united Germany.
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A post-racist premise, by contrast, offers a more nuanced
reading which more accurately reflects the actual distinctions and
discriminations being made. Put differently, if we view Germany as
a state endeavoring to protect and promote its liberal identity (that is,
as a predominantly liberal rather than German nation state), the
distinctions governing formal and informal access to the socio
economic, political and cultural privileges in Germany become
clearer and more comprehensible.
The least privileged group comprises those currently residing
outside the FRG. For the most part, they are to be kept out because
they are seen to represent a potential strain on the economy and
threat to the liberal democratic political system. This policy has its
origins in the halt in the recruitment of foreign workers in 1973 and
has found most recent expression in the Schengen Agreement and the
revision of the law governing political asylum. However, as we saw,
the policy has also been directed at ethnic Germans living outside the
FRG through the annual limit placed on the number admitted.
Not all "outsiders," however are unwelcome. Those deemed
beneficial to the economy enjoy superior rights of access. All
members of the EU may work and reside in Germany at will
because, as members, they are assumed already to have been
integrated into liberal societies in their homelands. Still other
outsiders receive selective access based on changing economic needs.
For instance, the Friendship Treaty with Poland in 1991 made pro
vision for the granting of a specified number of temporary work
permits for Poles to fill seasonal labor shortages. Nor is economic
gain the only criterion used to distinguish between welcome and
unwelcome outsiders. The revised asylum law, for instance, still
grants political refuge to anyone who qualifies as a political as
opposed to an economic refugee. And this is because offering a safe
haven for the politically persecuted is seen as one defining character
istic of a liberal society. Similarly, the immediate family members of
resident aliens enjoy the right to immigrate under Article 6 of the
Basic Law which protects the sanctity of the family - yet another
integral value of a liberal society.
Further distinctions based on liberal traits apply to those
already residing in the FRG. As we saw, neither resident aliens nor
East Germans (as groups) enjoy full de jure or de facto political and
socio-economic equality with West Germans. And this is because
they are seen (portrayed) as persons who have yet completely to
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internalize the requisite norms and values of liberal citizens. They
are to be assisted (often at considerable expense to the state) in
becoming bona fide liberals (better students, better workers, better
democrats, better neighbors, etc.) but should neither expect nor be
allowed to enjoy all the same rights and privileges of West Germans
until the liberalizing mission is complete.
This leaves, of course, the West Germans, understood as those
who were citizens of the FRG before the major changes stemming
from the revolutions of 1989 commenced. Their rights and privi
leges are to be endangered and disturbed as little as possible as
Germany adjusts to the dramatically new environment in Europe.
Yet this group is not unchanging. It would appear to include East
Germans who can convincingly demonstrate their liberal credentials
through rapid assimilation to West German ways (for instance, in the
marketplace or in politics) but also increasing numbers of non
Germans. The New Aliens Law of 1991 has made naturalization (and
thus equal.. rights of political 'participation) for non-Germans much
easier as has the toleration of dual citizenship since 1993. Further
more, if strides toward genuine European citizenship continue to be
made by the EU, Germany stands either directly or indirectly to add
millions of non-German citizens to its ranks. United Germany, in
other words, is not likely to become a predominantly German
nation-state in the future. It is likely to remain, however, a predomi
nantly liberal nation state in which key distinctions and statuses are
increasingly determined not on the basis of race, nation, or creed,
but rather on the post-racist basis of (il)liberal traits and aptitudes.
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